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ABSTRACT 
This chapter reviews research on the small group foundations of community 
participation and civil society.  The approach used is interdisciplinary in nature, 
combining social psychological and microsociological research with wider-reaching 
theories of civil society and democratic theory, and arguing that the two are 
fundamentally linked. Fist, it is argued that associational groups provide both 
opportunities (bridges) and obstacles (barriers) for participation on a wider level, each 
of which is discussed in turn.  It is argued that small groups provide micro-
environments that allow individuals to develop cognitive and emotional models of 
citizenship, empowerment, and inclusion.  However, the small group literature also 
points to cognitive biases, exclusionary tendencies, and irrational behavior associated 
with groups that call into question their ability to provide sustainable models of 
democratic participation.  It is argued that many of the failings of participatory 
democracy cannot be understood without reference to the small group origins of modern 
democracies. In order to chart a path between these seeming contradictory findings the 
chapter concludes by posing the question of whether a polity based on principles of 
group psychology can sustain universalistic aspirations such as tolerance, universal 
participation, and mutual respect, or whether ultimately such aspirations break down 
into in-fighting and factionalism.  An attempt is made to suggest provisional solutions 
based on social psychological research.  Specifically, research on group relations that 
examines moderators of inter-group biases and factors that promote inclusion is 
suggested as a fruitful direction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
   Community empowerment within democratic societies depends on the ability of 
a populace to generate ways of governing themselves from the bottom-up, a process 
which implies a thriving civil society based on informal group associations (e.g. 
Habermas, 1991). The idea that associational ties in civil society are essential to 
functioning democracies was popularized by Robert Putnam (1995), who argued that 
local networks of community members, through their informal friendship and 
associational networks, lay foundations of trust that underlay democracies.  Since 
Putnam, this idea, often referred to by the term “social capital”, has provided an 
important bridge between the areas of interpersonal communication and social 
psychology, on the one hand, and political science and economics, on the other hand.  
According to Goette & Huffman (2007), social capital provides community members 
with stable social bonds that are require for trust to develop.  This trust allows market 
and other transactions to take place in informationally asymmetric situations.  Without 
this possibility, the development of liberal democracy would be hindered or slowed. 
Although civil society associations are necessary for liberal democracy, these 
associations need not be overtly political or economic in nature; rather, they tend to 
consist in a wide variety of interest and grass-roots associations that are political only 
indirectly (Habermas, 1991).  According to Flyvbjerg (1998, p 211), “The fundamental 
act of citizenship in a pluralist democracy is that of forming an association of this kind”. 
Linking sentiments such as trust and solidarity to wider political structures, therefore, 
involves an exploration into the small group foundations of such structures. 
The current chapter attempts to clarify the link between small groups and wider 
civil society participation by examining the ways in which groups can both aid and                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  4
hinder the formation of community cohesion.  It is argued that personal identifications 
with small groups provide the basis for wider conceptions of community and civil 
society empowerment.  Fundamentally, small groups lay the psychological groundwork 
for citizenship and participation, providing models for how individuals relate to the 
public spheres they inhabit.   
Recent work has suggested that small groups provide a “microfoundation” for 
communities and social movements (Collins, 1981; Summers-Effler, 2002).  According 
to this perspective, civil society relies on group identity in order gain a sense of 
empowerment (Bernstein, 1997) and to mobilize effectively (Calhoun, 1994). These 
small groups rely on group communication and identity building in order to identify, 
develop and lobby for political and social benefits.  In addition, Klandermans (1992) 
argues that the development of political interests itself is tied to the formation of 
cohesive group identities which act as incubators and mobilizers of these interests.  
According to Johnson (1991), such groups empower communities within democratic 
societies by spreading an ethic of patriotism and democracy. 
  On the other hand, social psychology alerts us to the danger of what Fine and 
Harrington (2004) call the “balkanizing” effect of groups.  Groups establish and 
reproduce boundaries between their members and the outside world, often separating 
members from the wider society (e.g. Pratt, 2000), and denigrating out-group members 
(e.g. Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  In addition, a long tradition in social psychology has 
pointed to the irrational and often absurd behavior of groups (e.g. LeBon, 1895; 
McDougall; Janis, 1982).  If such groups form the basis for democratic society, then it 
is questionable whether such a society could be built on the rational basis that classic 
and contemporary democratic theory has hoped (e.g. Habermas, 1981).                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  5
  Thus, parting from the supposition that groups are important in the study of 
democratic civil society, the questions remain: In what ways and under what conditions 
do groups provide important bridges from individual citizen to the wider political 
sphere, and in what ways and under what conditions do they erect barriers to political 
participation.  The remainder of the discussion consists of an attempt to make inroads 
into these two questions. 
SMALL GROUPS AS BRIDGES 
Empowerment in Groups and Innovation  
  In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jurgen Habermas (1991) 
argues that a key development in democratic society occurred when public or quasi 
public spaces became forums for discussion among members of the community.  These 
spaces, which existed between the market and the state, formed a sphere of public 
discourse that provided a basis for the collective development of public rationality, 
diffusing ideas among members and leading to a participatory, progressive growth of 
social ideas.   
  The idea that community participation in discourse and decision making can lead 
to innovative outcomes is strongly rooted to the small group level of analysis.  
Habermas’ public sphere developed in coffee houses and other small spaces, spaces 
where community groups rather than large public manifestations would have 
dominated. These small groups act, in effect, as “incubators of innovation” (Fine & 
Harrington, 2004) where synergy between individual’s ideas is possible, with neither 
the impersonal social pressure of lager collectives nor the solipsism of the isolated 
individual. 
In line with this idea, empirical work in group and team research suggests that 
small groups can stimulate processes important for social functioning.  For example,                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  6
Dennis & Valachich (1993) found that small groups in an interactive setting produced 
more ideas on average than individuals acting separately.  In addition, Watson, 
Michaelsen & Sharp (1991) found that group improvements over individual problem 
solving increased as groups gained experience with each other, a condition more likely 
to reflect real world group circumstances. Such effects may be best explained by 
Osborn’s (1957) notion of group “synergy” in which the feedback mechanisms among 
members ensure that the intellectual product of the group is more than the sum of its 
individually acting parts.  The small group thus becomes both a mechanism for 
individual development and a sounding board through which individuals’ ideas can 
become transferred into the public sphere. 
Groups as a Basis for Trust and Commitment  
  A second way in which small groups can provide the basis for a larger 
community orientation toward participation is through the establishment of bonds of 
trust and confidence.  Some authors (e.g. Geertz, 1978) have noted that trust is a key 
component for market functioning, and that problems with coordination in markets are 
often resolved through interpersonal trust. Fukuyama (1999), for example, argues that 
the interactions required in modern production systems require trust among the various 
levels of management.  These bonds of trust are often established on the basis of 
experiences in everyday social groups (Fukuyama, 1995).  If the larger political sphere 
is often characterized as based largely on self-interest and power, then small groups may 
provide a setting in which influence and trust co-exist as bases for group continuance, 
laying a foundation for civic virtue that is later projected into the political sphere (Fine 
& Holyfield, 1996). 
  Relatedly, notions of citizenship and identity with the political community may 
find their origins in small group life.  According to Billig (1995), personal identities are                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  7
based in lived experiences that are difficult to ground in the universalistic and formal 
bureaucracies of larger polities.  Such lived experiences are generally in the context of 
the personal associations with a person’s life, and thus the individual’s self-concept as a 
member of a community is more strongly bound to these associational groupings than to 
more abstract civic ideals at the national level.    
  The above does not imply, however, that small group and national identities are 
at odds.  On the contrary, small groups may lay the groundwork for national identities 
by providing the format for stories of citizenship, heroism, and inclusion that create 
pride in larger national structures (Johnson, 1991).  Were it not for such ground-level 
associations, the nation-state could seem alienating and removed from the individual 
lifeworld; small groups, however, reconnect these two levels by sharing stories and 
discourses that reinforce citizenship, and censuring behavior that seems anti-social.    
Informal norms and the Maintenance of Social Order 
  Fourth, interpersonal community groups can increase the effectiveness of 
political institutions by reducing the need for legal monitoring and enforcement.   As 
Fine and Harrington (2004) point out, top-down monitoring and policing can be 
expensive and ineffective policies, for which few are willing to contribute and which 
can cause resentment; however, community policing, by contrast, involves a sentiment 
of “community service” and can avoid such resentment.  In addition, with community 
enforcement of institutional rules through voluntary associations can both effectively 
pressure individuals to fall in line with social norms and instill as sense of neighborhood 
pride.   
  In addition to security and policing, small groups alleviate much of the work that 
would fall to public institutions by codifying informal dispute resolution norms which 
regulate relations between people within a community (e.g. Ostrom, 1999).  Such norms                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  8
act in practice as de facto judicial systems, exerting social pressure short of violence to 
impose order.  In this way, neighborhood community and other small organizations can 
perform “public” services, tax-free, on a purely voluntary basis (Ellickson, 1991). 
Social Action and Mobilization   
One of the factors that prevent people from engaging with the political process is 
the fear that they will be acting alone, and therefore will be ostracized (Moriarty, 1974) 
or ineffectual (Granovetter, 1977).  Rather than an irrational fear, they may be right; 
groups tend to criticize members who do not conform to group norms (e.g. Goffman, 
1963), and social action, in order to influence macro political process, must reach a 
certain threshold of popularity before it becomes an important force (Granovetter, 
1977). 
Psychologically, we can link threshold models with a common human drive to search 
for social reinforcement of beliefs and behaviors (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).  Social 
psychology has discovered robust social effects of groups on individual thought and 
action, such as conformity effects (e.g. Asch, 1951), groupthink (Janis, 1982) and group 
shift (Myers & Lamm, 1976).  Although these effects will be discussed in the next 
section in terms of their potentially fallacious effects on cognition, the propensity of 
groups to “stick together” as a unit (entitativity cite) is also an important precursor to 
political participation.  As in Hirshman’s (1986) “bandwagon effect”, people often are 
only willing to engage in social activity if they see others who are willing to join them, 
or who are already so engaged. 
  Politically, groups also tend to exert policy pressure in ways impossible by either 
individual citizens or larger public associations.  Because interest groups are shielded 
from the exigency of impartiality that modern bureaucracies stress, they can openly 
lobby for political outcomes that would be difficult to promote from within the system.                                                                                   Microfoundations of Community  9
Larger than individuals, but treated as individuals (e.g. Calhoun, 2002), larger organic 
groups can effectively promote social change.  Gould (1993), for example, analyses 
how much of the social pressure in worker’s movements came from small groups of 
networked individuals, and not from a large rival political parties. 
In sum, groups provide an important bridge between individuals and their 
governments.  When combined synergistically, groups can produce more ideas and 
innovation than individuals.  Groups provide a basis for trust in an otherwise impersonal 
market economy, buffering against uncertainty and facilitating economic interaction.  
Groups create models of national identity, passing along civic virtues and templates for 
treating fellow citizens. Groups enforce norms and maintain order in otherwise difficult 
to police situations, saving time, money, and legitimacy which would be wasted were 
these tasks done publicly.  Finally, groups create a critical mass needed for political 
mobilization, convincing citizens to partake in the political process for both rational and 
irrational reasons.  In all these ways, associational groups seem an intrinsic part of a 
participatory democracy, echoing Toquevilles (1969), and more recently, Putnam’s 
(1995) celebration of the group bases of democratic politics. 
  However, a closer look at the details above already suggests that there may be a 
negative side to small groups, which can act as barriers as well as bridges to democracy.  
The policing functions described above, the tendency for conformity and the possibility 
of group biases all can give rise to both pro and anti- democratic tendencies.  In the next 
section, I will attempt to make sense of the negative side of small groups in the context 
of democratic participation. 
SMALL GROUPS AS BARRIERS 
  The previous section built upon the idea that small groups can provide a bridge 
between individuals and the larger civic sphere, mainly through their ability to link                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  10
community values to the lived experiences of individuals.  However, many decades of 
research on group behavior has shown that groups can produce divisiveness as well as 
cohesion, and that that this divisiveness may in fact be a product of the very group 
cohesion celebrated in the civil society literature (Tajfel, 1982).  In addition, within the 
group itself, factors present in the group process can lead to inhibited cognitive 
processes (Janis, 1982; Janis & Mann, 1977) as well as the inability of the group to 
produce decisions that rival the quality of individually made decisions (e.g. Aldag & 
Fuller, 1993).  Beginning with the taxing effect that groups can have on rationality, I 
will then discuss how motivated cognitive biases can lead to intergroup discrimination 
and the loss of a sense of the wider community, ultimately leading to intergroup 
exclusionary behavior and, at the extreme, group dehumanization and aggression 
(Goldstein, 2002). 
The Irrationality of Small Groups 
  An important aspect of participatory democracy is that, rather than imposing a 
pre-set system of preferences and values on a polity, it allows these preferences and 
values to emerge organically from within the polity.  This aspect, for better or for 
worse, essentially guarantees that there will not be a determinate outcome to public 
discourse, but rather an ongoing conversation that that provisionally establishes the 
public culture at any given snapshot of time (Chambers, 1995).    
For such a conversation to lead to a just society, however, this conversation must 
approximate an ideal conversation among rational actors, who interact not on the basis 
of their own material interests, but on the basis of a true search for a legitimate social 
order (Habermas, 1981). Needless to say, such an ideal conversation is not an empirical 
description of democratic reality, but a moral ideal which exists as the goal of a 
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Empirical studies of group interaction, by contrast, have shown a much different 
picture of interpersonal process, one less rooted in an impartial stance toward outcome 
and more of a hodgepodge of emotions, interests, and identity negotiations (e.g. 
Kelman, 2006).  To the extent that group biases derail the Habermasian process of 
legitimation, they may undermine the theoretical possibility for a rationally justifiable 
democratic society. 
  For instance, classical research in social psychology has established that people 
tend to conform their responses to group norms, even when those responses are 
obviously and absurdly wrong (e.g. Ashe, 1951).  In addition to erroneous responding, 
Sherif (1935) found that, even after controlling for group presence, isolated individuals 
who had been influenced by their group continued to believe in group norms after the 
group had been disbanded.  Similarly, Tetlock, Skitka & Boettger (1989) found that 
people who know their audience’s views are likely to modify their arguments to fit with 
the groups pre-existing opinions. These results suggest that, both behaviorally and 
cognitively, people produced biased outcomes due to small group influence.  Tempered 
by such conclusions, it may seem unreasonable to expect small groups to inculcate 
values of rational democratic participation, and may be more likely to promote 
conformity and a lack of discussion.  
  Perhaps the most well known example of irrational group behavior is the 
phenomenon of groupthink (Janis, 1982).  Groupthink occurs in small groups with high 
cohesion, complex issues to resolve, strong emotional bonds between members, and low 
external accountability, a list which may accurately describe many civil society groups.  
This combination, according to Janis, results in a resistance to considering diverse 
alternatives, blind adherence to a leader’s directives, “mindguards” to censure and 
exclude peripheral members, and an illusion of anonymity.  In a similar vein, the group                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  12
polarization hypothesis of  Myers and Lamm (1976) posits that group members, in the 
presence of like minded members, tend to polarize their views on topics, holding more 
extreme opinions than they would have otherwise.  Finally, the common knowledge 
effect (Gigone & Hastie, 1993) suggests that people in groups focus on similarities 
rather than differences, talking only about commonly held topics.  This produces an 
illusion of consensus that can suppress debate.  In short, decades of social psychological 
research in different theoretical lines have converged on a picture of group life that not 
only fails to confirm, but actively refutes, the picture of group interaction as a paradigm 
of participative democratic communication. 
Intergroup bias and discrimination  
  From the above, it should be clear that group interaction can lead to barriers to 
thought and dialogue that can threaten the ability to participate rationally in a 
democratic community.  These processes limit the democratic value of groups by 
showing how groups can fail to realize the idea of free participation.  However, while 
the biases discussed above limit the usefulness of groups, they do not actively erode the 
communities in which the groups exist.  However, some evidence suggests that groups 
not only are imperfect vehicles for community participation, but can actually harm the 
formation of a unified community and create a divided citizenry. 
  The most important line of research in this vein is Tajfel & Turners (e.g. 1986) 
social identity theory, which attempted to explain how people are motivated to think in 
biased ways about social groups. Tajfel’s (1970) work involved “judgmental 
accentuation”, in which people tend to exaggerate salient aspects of cognitive 
categories, viewing members of categories as homogeneous and polarized with respect 
to non-members. In the context of social categories, the implication was that people 
view their groups as fundamentally different from out-groups, and would, as a                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  13
consequence, exaggerate group differences.  Tajfel (1970; Tajfel, Flament, Billig & 
Bundy, 1971; Tajfel & Turner 1986) experimentally showed that psychologically salient 
groups led to out-group derogation and could be a basis of group conflict, even when no 
resource conflicts existed between the groups.  In other words, the simple presence of 
group boundaries led to out-group derogation. People were likely to view positive 
aspects of their group, and negative aspects of other groups, leading to negatively biased 
out-group views (Dovidio et al, 1998), stereotyped judgments of others (Smith, 1999), 
disrespect for out-group members (Linnehan et al, 2002), and withholding of important 
resources from other groups (Sidanius, Pratto & Mitchell, 1994) 
Not inconsistent with the above, recent research suggests that not only do 
individuals positively bias their in-groups and denigrate out-groups, but they actually 
tend to view out-group members as less “human” than in-group members (Leyens, 
Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Guant, Paladino, Vaes & Demoulin, 2001; Vaes, Paladin & 
Leyens, 2006).   According to this literature, group membership can produce “infra-
humanization”, where uniquely human traits, such as human emotions and intelligence 
are attributed only to in-group members.  In particular, traits associated with 
“humanness” usually included those associated with rational cognitive functioning, 
culture, and agentic aspects of persons (Demoulin, Leyens, Paladino Rodriguez & 
Dovidio, 2004).  It is specifically these more human traits that tend to be compromised 
through the formation of in-groups and out-groups.   
The infrahumanization bias creates a barrier to the building of a participatory 
democratic ethos in two important and related ways. The first is through the erosion of a 
universalist and rationalist view of the human agent as a foundation for democratic 
society.  Modern thinking in the democratic tradition has held the rational agentic 
person as a fundamental unit of analysis in understanding the political order.  This has                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  14
taken the form of a universal imperative to treat persons as agents rather than as means-
to an end (Kant, 1959) as well as in utilitarian claims that each person is fundamentally 
the best judge of his or her own good (Mill, 1998). Contemporary theorists like Rawls 
(1971), building on the Kantian tradition, argue that we must be able to put ourselves in 
an “original position” where we can take the perspective of citizens independently of 
our own social position. Even critical theorists such as Habermas, recognizing that 
community is necessary for rationality, still treats individuals-in-conversation as able to 
seek objectively legitimate solutions though rational discourse (Habermas, 1981).  
Ultimately, it is this aspect of persons that justifies the delegation of political power to 
the people themselves, rather than the concentration of power in a small group of 
decision makers.  In other words, it only seems legitimate to empower communities if 
we see the people that make up those communities as able to understand what is best for 
themselves and their communities.  Such a capacity, moreover, involves the recognition 
of humanness in all citizens, of their capacity to participate fully in a community of 
conscious citizens. 
While the infrahumanization perspective emerged as an attempt to explain 
ethnocentrism and intergroup discrimination (Vaes et al, 2003), and was not directly 
linked to civil society and community empowerment, a link to the latter can clearly be 
established. To the extent that the formation of small groups leads people to 
systematically undermine the “humanness” of other citizens, it short circuits the 
presupposition of a rational subject that underlies democratic moral theory.   To treat 
people as less than full participants in the social order would be to erode the 
participatory ethic that undergirds democratic morality.  
Thus, the biasing effect of small groups in the first way that infrahumanization 
undermines participation. The second way is through the problematization of the idea                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  15
that small groups provide a template for citizenship through the inclusion of social 
mores in the lived experience and identities of individuals. As discussed above, one of 
the hopes for small groups as “carriers” of civic virtues was that these groups, but 
grounding social relations in lived, everyday experiences, could make civic participation 
more palpable in people’s lives.  By contrast to the formalistic and abstract principles of 
democracy at the national level, participation in groups would teach people that 
participation is about making real decisions in concrete contexts that affect actual 
people.  The hope was that such a grounding could lay a basis that would then be 
transferred into a notion of citizenship more generally (Johnson, 1991).   
If, however, the very process of establishing cohesive small groups causes 
people to undermine civic values outside the group, then the metaphor of “transfer” may 
be misplaced.  Seemingly, forming groups can create close community ties, but it is not 
certain if these ties will generalize or not. The key questions are: “Under what 
conditions does establishing community ties within a group reinforce community ties 
generally, and under what conditions do within group ties substitute or undermine wider 
citizenship relations?”  Unfortunately, current research does not provide a consistent 
answer to this problem yet. 
BETWEEN BRIDGES AND BARRIERS: CHARTING A PATH FOR SMALL 
GROUPS 
This chapter has argued that the group foundations of civil society provide 
opportunities (bridges) and obstacles (barriers) for participation on a wider level.  I 
argued that small groups provide micro-environments that allow individuals to develop 
cognitive and emotional models of citizenship, empowerment, and inclusion.  However, 
the small group literature also points to cognitive biases, exclusionary tendencies, and 
irrational behavior associated with groups that call into question their ability to provide                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  16
sustainable models of democratic participation.  It is argued that many of the failings of 
participatory democracy cannot be understood without reference to the small group 
origins of modern democracies. 
In order to chart a path between these seeming contradictory findings regarding 
small groups within civil society, the final section of this chapter attempts to resolve the 
seeming dichotomy between discussing the universalism versus particularism in group 
life.  The key question is whether a polity based on principles of group psychology can 
sustain universalistic aspirations such as tolerance, universal participation, and mutual 
respect, or whether ultimately such aspirations break down into in-fighting and 
factionalism.   
A provisional solution to inter-group factionalism may be aided by research on 
group relations that examines moderators of inter-group biases and factors that promote 
inclusion.  If the positive elements of groups can be maximized, while avoiding the 
more divisive aspects, such a solution seems possible.  Three areas are suggested as 
important (but not exclusive) starting points; the negation of group “faultlines”, the 
salience of super-ordinate goals, and the promotion of interaction rituals that reinforce 
community sentiment.  Each of these is discussed in turn. 
Patching Faultlines to Minimize Intergroup Conflict 
  As discussed above, in-group categorizations can lead to biased information 
processing, stereotyping, inter-group discrimination, and infra humanization (Tajfel, 
1982, Vaes et al, 2006).  These effects are established by the creation of psychological 
barriers that separate groups, creating a feeling of “us” versus them.   
  The concept of faultlines (Lau & Murningham, 1998; 2005) may be useful in 
understanding how these various categorizations can amplify or cancel each other.  
According to this concept, people belong not to one but to many various groups, and                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  17
thus have multiple social identities.  When the membership of one group overlaps 
closely with membership in another or various other groups, a faultline is created which 
amplifies the effects of group division.  For example, a white male and a white female 
share membership in a racial, but not a gender, group, whereas a white male and a black 
female are divided on both racial and gender lines.  When groups form such that many 
group membership overlap with each other (e.g. everyone from a certain neighborhood 
also goes to the same church, supports the same sports team and also belongs to the 
same activist group), then in-out group relations can become exacerbated, because the 
salience of one group identity can be easily transferred to the other identities as well.  
On the other hand, if group memberships are “staggered” such that an out-group 
member in one group is an in-group member of another group, then the contagious 
effect of out-group discrimination is minimized. 
  In the context of community empowerment and small groups, the faultlines 
construct provides a possible solution to negative aspects of groups.  These aspects are 
most destructive when various group identities are aligned, particularly when social 
groups are aligned with demographic categories such as race or gender (Lau & 
Murnighan, 1998).  Attempts to promote diversity within civil society groups may have 
the beneficial effect of “crossing” demographic lines within social groups.  While 
demographic diversity has often been endorsed as a way to increase creativity and 
innovation by adding different experiences to groups (e.g. Cox & Blake, 1991), this 
suggest another possible benefit.  Such diversity, according to the faultlines perspective, 
may interact with other social category effects, “patching up” a faultline and reducing 
the baising effect of social groups even where these other groups were not the target of 
diversity efforts. Thus diversity in one social category may reduce group tension in 
other categories.                                                                                    Microfoundations of Community  18
Establishing Superordinate Group Goals 
  A second important way in which group bias can be reduced is through the 
establishment of superordinate goals (Allport, 1954; Sherif, Harvey, While, Hood & 
Sherif, 1961; Gaertner, Dovidio, Banker, Houlette, Johnson & McGlynn, 2000).  In 
their famous Robber’s Cave experiment, Sherif and his colleague showed that rival 
groups, when faced with a common challenge, tend to increase cooperation, fairness and 
liking.  From this result, the notion of superordinate goals became an important 
moderator of the inter-group bias effect.  
  Two important caveats, however, deserve mention.  First, even within the Sherif 
study, the de-biasing effects of a superordinate goal were temporary (Gaertner et al, 
2000).  Once the goal dissipated, the underlying group based conflict re-emerged. 
Applying and generalizing to the political sphere, we may speculate that resurgences of 
ethnic and other inter-group conflict may occur after the disappearance of a common 
antagonism for both groups, which would explain the post colonial and post Cold-War 
origins of some ethnic conflict (e.g. Brubaker & Laitin, 1998). This suggests that using 
such goals to galvanize diverse civil society groups within a polity may be a temporary 
solution at best, particularly if the group categories involved are resistant to re-
categorization (e.g. Gaertner et al, 2000) and thus will tend to reassert themselves. 
  Building on the notion of re-categorization, the second caveat against 
superordinate goals involves the benefits of group membership.  Although avoiding 
group discrimination, bias and conflict is important, some avoidance strategies may 
come at the cost of losing the empowering benefits of group membership (civic values, 
trust, community bonds).  Approaches to reducing bias often are based on de-
identifying or re-identifying with a different group (e.g. Gaertner et al, 2000).  The de-
identifying strategy avoids discrimination at the cost of the benefits of groups, while the                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  19
re-identifying strategy risks recreating antagonisms at a different level.  Thus, while 
identities may be strategically managed (Bernstein, 2005) to avoid particularly difficult 
group conflicts, such a management must be careful not to lose the benefits of social 
belonging, trust, and meaning that groups provide. 
Promoting Interaction Rituals that Bridge Groups and Polities 
  As discussed above, the power of studying community participation through its 
microstructures of interpersonal and small group relations is that these relations describe 
the everyday lived experiences of individuals, which are often not done justice by the 
large, long term and formalized structures of “macro” politics.  The latter may, 
however, become salient in the minds of individuals through ceremonial and ritual 
events, which highlight wider community values (Durkheim, 1961; Trice & Beyer, 
1984).  These rituals put national identities into palpable form by linking wider social 
structures to spectacular, memorable events, thus symbolically anchoring national 
identities in ways that do not contradict the day to day group existence of individuals.  
Such events do not have to recur continuously to have an effect on identities; annual 
events such as national celebrations of independence or occasional political elections 
may function through their symbolic weight rather than the frequency of their  
recurrence.  Some ritual events, such as marriages, graduation ceremonies, and other 
rites of passage effectively create psychological identifications that last throughout an 
individual’s lifetime even if they occur only once (Van Gennep, 1960). 
  In terms of the creation of participatory democracy, ritual participation can 
involve groups and at the same time signify wider community identity. Pratt (2000), for 
example, found that small group meetings among Amway workers fed into a larger 
organizational identity that worked through, not against, individual mentor 
relationships.  Another particularly interesting example is Ackerman and Fishkin’s                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  20
(2004) idea of “Deliberation Day”.  This proposed national holiday would be comprised 
of small groups that meet on an official national holiday to discuss national issues, in an 
attempt to stimulate democratic deliberation among the populace.  The immediate 
format of the groups would be small and interpersonal, but the content of the discussion 
would be national, thus linking the immediacy of small group deliberation with concern 
over important social issues. 
  While the above ideas do not exhaust the possibilities for trying to combine 
small group life with political participation and the wider civil society, they attempt to 
offer some directions in thinking about this topic.  The key message is that, despite 
potentially destructive group processes, the relation between groups and polities is not 
necessarily antagonistic.  The focus for future thought on this topic should be to more 
intricately describe when micro identities feed into macro identities, and how the 
strengths of the two can be used together. 
CONCLUSION 
  This chapter has attempted to clarify the role of small groups in creating 
participation in democratic public life.  While recent literature in the social sciences 
(e.g. Putnam, 1995) has touted the importance of associational grouping in establishing 
and maintaining healthy democracies, it is important to recognize that the two do not 
always go hand in hand.  Groups can be key in forming the basic social makeup of 
individuals, teaching persons how to be citizens by forming bonds of trust and identity.  
They can be engines of ideas and motivational forces that stimulate public participation.  
However, they can also generate irrationality and division.  Thus, thought in this area 
must attempt to look in closer detail at the specific process that cause groups to boost or 
undermine community sentiment.  Such inquiry is important to ensure that our political 
process affirms and represents the lived experiences of the people that it governs, while                                                                                  Microfoundations of Community  21
recognizing equally that politics does not flow seamlessly from interpersonal relations 
into governance structures.  As mediators of the relation between individuals and 
society, groups can channel individual sentiments into participation or into rejection of 
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